Attorney-General backs court challenge to OSP’s independent powers

The Attorney-General has filed arguments at the Supreme Court questioning whether the Office of the Special Prosecutor can lawfully prosecute cases without his direct approval, in a move that could reshape the country’s anti-corruption framework.

In an affidavit filed on 8 April 2026 in the case of Adamtey v Attorney-General, the state’s chief legal adviser argues that parts of the OSP Act, 2017 conflict with the 1992 Constitution because they allow the Special Prosecutor to begin criminal proceedings independently.

The central constitutional issue is Article 88, which the Attorney-General says gives prosecutorial authority to his office alone.

On that basis, the filing maintains that Parliament could not validly create a separate prosecuting institution with powers that operate outside the Attorney-General’s supervision. While accepting that the OSP was established to tackle corruption, the Attorney-General argues that it cannot lawfully function as an autonomous prosecutorial body beyond constitutional control.

The case itself was brought by private citizen Noah Ephraem Tetteh Adamtey, who is challenging the legal structure that underpins the OSP’s independent operations.

What the Attorney-General now seeks is the removal of those parts of the law that permit the Special Prosecutor to prosecute corruption cases without first obtaining a fiat or express authorisation from his office.

The legal battle is unfolding against the background of an earlier setback for the OSP. On 27 January 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed the office’s own application to join the case in order to defend the constitutionality of its mandate. The Attorney-General had opposed that move, arguing that the OSP was not a necessary party to the suit.

If the Supreme Court ultimately accepts the Attorney-General’s interpretation, the consequences could be far-reaching.

Such a ruling would mean the OSP could no longer independently commence prosecutions in major corruption cases. Instead, each prosecution could require separate approval from the Attorney-General, potentially slowing down ongoing investigations and trials and reducing the office’s operational autonomy.

Critics of that position have long argued that the OSP was created precisely to address cases involving politically exposed persons, where dependence on the Attorney-General, a presidential appointee, could raise questions of conflict or influence.

For supporters of the Special Prosecutor, its independence is not a side issue but the core of its institutional purpose.